Alarm flood reduction using multiple data sources by Rodrigo Marco, Vicent
 
Department of Automatic Control 
 
Alarm flood reduction using 
multiple data sources 
Vicent Rodrigo Marco 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MSc Thesis 
ISRN LUTFD2/TFRT--5961--SE 
ISSN 0280-5316 
Department of Automatic Control 
Lund University 
Box 118 
SE-221 00 LUND 
Sweden 
© 2014 by Vicent Rodrigo Marco. All rights reserved. 
Printed in Sweden by Media-Tryck 
Lund 2014 
 
Abstract
The introduction of distributed control systems in the process industry has increased
the number of alarms per operator exponentially. Modern plants present a high level
of interconnectivity due to steam recirculation, heat integration and the complex
control systems installed in the plant. When there is a disturbance in the plant it
spreads through its material, energy and information connections affecting the pro-
cess variables on the path. The alarms associated to these process variables are
triggered. The alarm messages may overload the operator in the control room, who
will not be able to properly investigate each one of these alarms. This undesired sit-
uation is called an “alarm flood”. In such situations the operator might not be able to
keep the plant within safe operation. The aim of this thesis is to reduce alarm flood
periods in process plants. Consequential alarms coming from the same process ab-
normality are isolated and a causal alarm suggestion is given. The causal alarm
in an alarm flood is the alarm associated to the asset originating the disturbance
that caused the flood. Multiple information sources are used: an alarm log contain-
ing all past alarms messages, process data and a topology model of the plant. The
alarm flood reduction is achieved with a combination of alarm log analysis, pro-
cess data root-cause analysis and connectivity analysis. The research findings are
implemented in a software tool that guides the user through the different steps of
the method. Finally the applicability of the method is proved with an industrial case
study.
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1
Introduction
This thesis presents the findings from the research conducted into establishing in-
novative ways to manipulate process plant data to facilitate the supervision and
monitoring of process plants. An off-line method to reduce alarm flooding in alarm
monitoring systems is proposed and a software tool that proves practical applicabil-
ity of the research findings is implemented.
1.1 Alarm Systems
The profit in the process industry is highly related to the plant operation. Over the
last decades advanced operation and control approaches have been developed in
order to optimally operate plants. This is done by keeping process variables at a
specific value [Christofides et al., 2007]. A deviation from the optimal operation
point is usually translated into an economic loss or endangering the environment or
the safety of the personnel. The operators working in the control room are in charge
of keeping the plant operating at this point.
An alarm system is the main element that interfaces in modern plants with the
operator to the plants. It is a crucial element since it monitors the plant operation
and alerts the operator when some undesired state that requires his assessment or
action is reached. Its main objectives are: to assist the operator to correct potentially
dangerous situations before the emergency shutdown system is triggered, to avoid
financial loss by identifying deviations from the optimal operating conditions and
to help the operator to better understand the process conditions that gave rise to
the upset. The primary function of an alarm system is defined by the EEMUA as
follows:
The purpose of an alarm system is to direct the operator’s attention towards
plant conditions requiring timely assessment or action [EEMUA-191, 2007].
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1.1.1 Alarms in Process Industry
An alarm is a signal sent to the operators in order to draw their attention during an
abnormal situation in the plant. An alarm occurrence comes usually together with a
sound, flashing light and an indicator. In addition, alarms usually present a message
with some information about the problem.
Every alarm presented to the operator should be useful and relevant to the
operator [EEMUA-191, 2007]. Ideally, for each abnormal situation just one alarm
is raised. However, operators usually receive a large amount of alarms in practice.
Most of these alarms are either false alarms, i.e. alarms that alert of an abnormal
situation when there is none, or nuisance alarms, i.e. alarms that are redundant,
since other alarms have already informed of the abnormality.
Traditionally an alarm in a process plant is associated to a process variable going
out of its normal range (see Figure 1.1).
High alarm trip point
Low alarm trip point
High alarm
Low alarm
Figure 1.1 Signal alarm
These type of alarms are called absolute alarms. However, one should bear in
mind that many other alarm detection mechanisms are used in practice, and not all
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alarms are strictly associated to a process signal. Some of these mechanisms are
listed below (for more information the reader is referred to [EEMUA-191, 2007]):
• bit-pattern alarms
• discrepancy alarms
• calculated alarms
• recipe-of-change alarms
• statistical alarms
• adaptive alarms
• ...
1.1.2 Alarm Floods, a source of plant incidents
In the past, alarms systems consisted of lamps and horns individually connected to
the process [Alarm Management: A Comprehensive Guide, Second Edition]. Since
setting an alarm with this conditions was costly and the space in the control room
was limited, every alarm was well thought through.
With the digital revolution, the introduction of Distributed Control Systems
(DCS) in the industry together with the reduction of the price of computer hard-
ware, the situation changed. An alarm nowadays is listed in a scrollable table or on
graphics, therefore there is no space limitation. Besides, adding a new alarm to the
alarm system is as easy as writing some code lines or clicking on the proper options.
There is no need of connection planning, no need of wiring, just typing. The costs
are thus practically non-existent. As a result, the number of configured alarms per
operator has increased exponentially in the last decades due to an abuse of the use
of alarms [Alarm Management: A Comprehensive Guide, Second Edition].
On the other hand, the increasing number of process variables present in mon-
itoring systems as a result of the technological evolution in the past decades has
brought many benefits: higher product quality, improved emissions control, and
higher productivity among others. New control algorithms have been developed to
increase the efficiency of plants. Control algorithms have become more complex
and more process variables are needed in the control loops. In addition to this, due
to the progress in sensor technology, a wider variety of process variables are now
accessible. However, each process variable brings along at least four alarms which
overloads the alarm system and makes the supervision of the process more complex.
Furthermore, modern plants are highly interconnected due to steam recircula-
tion, heat integration and complex control approaches to increase the efficiency of
13
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the plant. A single disturbance spreads fast through the plant due to these material,
energy and information connections triggering the alarm messages connected to
process signals in the path.
All of these elements lead to the regularity of the situation where the operator in
the control room is overloaded with a large amount of alarms. The operator cannot
take the time to properly analyse each alarm, which may cause critical alarms to be
ignored (e.g. acknowledged alarms not being properly investigated and corrected).
Missing a critical alarm translates into material losses, endangers the integrity of
the plant or even puts human life at risk.
The situation in which the operator is overwhelmed with a high number of
alarms is known as alarm flood or alarm shower. Alarm floods have been cited
as a significant cause to most industrial incidents investigated by the US Chemical
Safety Board (CBS) [Duisting Beebe and Logerot, 2007]. The definition of an alarm
flood is given in [ANSI/ISA-18.2, 2009] as:
“A condition during which the alarm rate is greater than the operator can
effectively manage (e.g., more than 10 alarms per 10 minutes).”
In order to illustrate the relevance of the problem, some real incidents that gave
motivation for this thesis are presented [Bransby and Jenkinson, 1998]:
“On a large petrochemical plant a trip occurred on a compressor. There were
two days lost production before the plant was put back on-line (cost around £1M).
Also, components in the plant were damaged by the trip, and some months later
the plant had to be taken off for an unscheduled outage to repair this damage. This
outage cost about £12M, but other work was done in this outage, so not all the
cost can be attributed to the trip. Six weeks prior to the compressor trip there had
been an alarm on high axial displacement which the operators accepted but did not
investigate. Three days prior to the trip there was a second similar alarm which
also was not investigated”.
“On 24th July 1994 there was a major explosion at the oil refinery at Milford
Haven jointly owned by Texaco and Gulf. There was plant damage that cost about
£48M to repair. There was also two months lost production from the complete
plant and four months lost production from the area that was damaged.[. . . ] Alarm
system shortcomings were one major contributor to this incident. There was a
lightning strike which caused a significant plant upset. For several hours after the
lightning strike the operators were heavily loaded with alarms at a rate estimated
to be in excess of 1 every 2-3 seconds. During this period several operators failed
to identify the buildup of liquid in a knock-out vessel. This eventually overfilled and
resulted in the explosion taking place. A number of instrument faults contributed
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to the operating confusion.[. . . ] A large number of people (26) sustained minor
injuries as a result of the explosion”.
After the incident of the oil refinery at Milford Haven, the British authorities
demanded the Engineering Equipement & Materials Users’ Association (EEMUA)
to establish a guide for the design of alarm management systems. Both EEMUA
guide and ISA Standard state that an operator should not receive more than six
alarms per hour. However, in most plants much higher numbers are encountered.
Situations where the operator receives too many alarms are common.
In [Henningsen and Kemmerer, 1995] it is stated that in a typical alarm log, a
big part of the unimportant alarms falls in the following categories:
• Repetitive alarms
• Standing alarms
• Consequence alarms
For removing repetitive and standing alarms a large variety of methods is avail-
able in the literature, such as: time delays, filtering (median filter, average filter, IIR
filter), dead band, difference functions and alarm window functions. Both academia
and industry have studied the reduction of these kinds of alarms for years. Intelligent
tools for reduction of nuisance alarms have been developed. An example of these
tools is the toolbox created at Lund Institute of Technology described by Jonas Ahn-
lund et al. in [Ahnlund et al., 2003] and [Bergquist et al., 2003]. The toolbox uses a
system called LARA (Logical Alarm Reduction Algorithm) that first classifies the
alarm signals into predefined groups and later applies the proper alarm handling
algorithms according to the signal group it belongs to. These techniques succeed
in lowering the number of alarms when the process is running in nominal condi-
tions. Nevertheless, when a fault or abnormality occurs and it propagates through
the plant, these methods can get rid of some of the alarms but they cannot solve the
problem of suppressing consequence alarms. Filtering consequence alarms is quite
complicated and requires analysing causal relationships in the process.
1.2 State of the Art
Recently, both industry and academia have put effort on reducing alarm floods in
the process industry. Researchers have focused on grouping consequential alarms,
i.e., isolate those alarms caused by the same event.
In [Higuchi et al., 2009], Fumitaka Higuchi et al. applied event correlation
analysis to alarm data from an ethylene plant in Japan in order to reduce the amount
of alarms. The similarity grade between alarms is determined by computing their
15
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cross correlation function. After that, the alarms are grouped using hierarchical
clustering. Junya Nishiguchi et al. showed the benefits of the same method with
a case study of a chemical site in [Nishiguchi and Takai, 2010]. Once the alarms
are clustered according to their similarity, an analysis of the results is performed.
The clusters obtained are classified according to their relationships. Consequential
alarms, complex operator actions (i.e. sequential operations that could be automa-
tized), unnecessary alarm and causes of upset are some of the possible relationships
between events in a certain cluster. However, to be able to calculate the event cross
correlation properly, knowledge of the time-delay between the alarms and the oper-
ator response is required.
F. Yang et al [Yang et al., 2012] propose a method to group correlated alarms by
generating continuous time pseudo data from the original binary alarm record via a
Gaussian kernel method. Once the data is transformed from discrete to continuous,
the pseudo data is being analysed using statistical approaches (correlation and sin-
gular value analysis). Using pseudo data instead of binary alarm data proved to have
some advantages: it reduces the influence of missed, false and chattering alarms,
the correlation analysis provides information about the direction of the correlation
(positive or negative), statistical approaches to analyse the data can be used and
information about the delay between alarms is not necessary.
Other authors suggest using sequence pattern matching for grouping conse-
quential alarms (e.g. [Kabir et al., 2013], [Cheng et al., 2013]). The authors of
[Kabir et al., 2013] and [Cheng et al., 2013] have noticed that a large portion of
the alarm occurrences in an alarm flood is related and follows a specific pattern. If
similar alarm floods are identified, it is easier to identify this pattern. The alarms
contained in this pattern are likely to be consequential alarms. Several methods for
clustering similar alarm floods have been proposed. In [Kabir et al., 2013] Kabir
Ahmed et al. present a method for clustering alarm floods according to the patterns
of the alarm sequences. In this approach, the time difference among the alarms is
disregarded. The similarity between different alarm flood sequences is determined
under the assumption that the alarms appear in a cause-consequence manner in the
alarm log. If we have a sequence [A, B, C, D] it is expected that B is caused by
A, C by B and so forth. However, this assumption may not be true for all cases as
the order of the alarms is highly dependent on their alarm limits. For instance, if
alarm A has narrow alarm limits while alarm B limits are set wide, even though the
disturbance originates from B and propagates to A, the alarm notification is first
triggered in A and later in B.
Additionally, Yue Cheng et al [Cheng et al., 2013] pointed out that the order of
appearance of the alarms in the sequence should not be taken at face value. The de-
tection delay of an abnormality is a probabilistic variable. It could be that a number
of linked alarms trigger practically at the same time and the order in which these
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alarms activate changes from case to case. Therefore, the exact order of appearance
of the alarms is not as important as their proximity in time. The authors of [Cheng
et al., 2013] presented an alternative method for pattern matching of alarm floods
based on the Smith-Waterman algorithm. In the algorithm the time-stamp of the
alarm sequence is taken into account in order to blur the order in the alarm sequence
when the alarms happen close in time.
Markus Schleburg et al [Schleburg et al., 2013] suggested an automated method
to reduce the alarms presented to the operator by grouping consequential alarms.
In order to do so not only the process alarm log are used (as in the previous cited
methods), but also a description of the plant topology (P&ID) and a set of rules
representing process knowledge. In this method, every possible pair of alarms is
checked against the rules and the plant topology to see if they are related or not.
The rules apply to different properties of the alarms such as the allowed time-frame
between alarms, their type (pressure, liquid flow, temperature), their status, type
of connection (physical or signal connection) and to which assets are to be found
between the locations of the alarms. Grouped alarms are shown clustered in the
alarm log. Solely the first and the last alarm in time are displayed. All other alarms
within the group are found by clicking on the first alarm. The method developed by
Markus Schleburg et al. was proved to be a promising technique to reduce the num-
ber of alarms in an alarm log by using process knowledge translated into tunable
interrelation rules. However, for the grouping tool to be useful, additional knowl-
edge about the plant is needed and it also requires some time from the operators to
set the necessary rules to adapt the method to a specific plant.
On the other hand, in the last years, several contributions from both academia
and industry investigated the design of systematic methods that search for
fault propagation paths and perform root-cause analysis of plant-wide distur-
bances. Data-driven methods that detect directionality between measurements have
emerged. Time delay analysis captures the causality relationship between process
variables using the time delay between them [Fan and Deyun, 2012]. In [Bauer
et al., 2007] Margret Bauer et al. demonstrate the effectiveness of a data-driven
method called Transfer Entropy that identifies the causality between measurements
even in absence of observable time delays between the process variables.
At the same time, the use of qualitative models in the area of fault diagnosis
has been an active area. Signed direct graphs (SDG) are a type of qualitative model.
They are able to describe causal relationships between process variables. In SDGs,
process variables are represented as nodes and the causal influence between them
(positive or negative) as arcs [Fan et al., 2010].
Recently, the benefits of combining both quantitative process history methods
and qualitative models have been studied. When used independently these methods
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can give rise to spurious results. The aim is to use data-driven analysis methods
to generate hypothesis regarding the possible root-cause, and after that use qual-
itative models (e.g. process connectivity) to validate the obtained result, i.e., if it
exists an actual physical or logical connection between the disturbed signals. In
this way, the number of spurious results is reduced. In [Thambirajah et al., 2009],
Jagatheeswaran Thambirajah et al. show the advantages of this combination with
an industrial case study. A connectivity matrix is derived from a CAEX description
of the process to explore the topology of the plant. The results obtained from the
analysis were validated by process experts.
In Summary, automatized methods for grouping consequential alarms are pro-
posed in the literature. These methods rely on alarm sequence analysis or on a
combination of process connectivity and case base reasoning. On the other hand,
causal root cause analysis of disturbance propagation enable to determine the prop-
agation path of a disturbance within a process using process data and process
connectivity information.
1.3 Scope
Within the last years, advanced alarm management systems and precedence (root-
cause) analysis for process plants have received an increasing attention from both
industrial and academic communities. In the alarm flood reduction area, alarm
records have been the traditional information source to identify related alarms.
However, recent studies have shown the benefits of combining alarm logs with
plant connectivity information to identify alarms caused by the same event. On the
other hand, methods for root-cause analysis using both data-driven analysis and
topology (plant connectivity) analysis have proved to be successful in finding the
root-cause of a plant upset.
The contribution of this thesis is to show the advantages of using a combination
of alarm, process and topology data to not only identify related alarms, but also
isolate the causal-alarm (alarm closest to the root) performing a precedence analy-
sis. To the authors’ best knowledge a method to identify the causal alarm within an
alarm flood using data-driven and topology analysis is still not available.
The goal of this study is to lower plant incidents by developing a method for
the reduction of alarm flood periods using multiple available information sources.
In addition, the research findings are implemented in a software application that
will basically guide the user through the different steps of the method. However,
extra information that helps the user to better understand the problem analysed or
the method is added.
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Pattern analysis of Alarm
sequences
In the past years, statistical pattern recognition has been found to be successful in
numerous applications such as genomics, health-informatics, anomaly/intrusion de-
tection or information retrieval. Similarity functions that measure the resemblance
between an ordered list of events has been used to classify sequences [Zhengzheng
et al., 2010]. This technique has been applied to calculate similarities between
alarm flood sequences [Kabir et al., 2013].
In the present work, it is assumed that similar alarm flood sequences are origi-
nated from the same kind of process abnormality. Pattern analysis is used to cluster
similar alarm flood sequences in order to find the flood patterns that characterises
the different abnormal situations encountered in a process plant.
In the proposed method, an algorithm that extracts the similarities between
alarm flood sequences taking into account their time-stamp is used. This algorithm
is the Modified Smith-Waterman algorithm (MSW) [Cheng et al., 2013] and it is
shortly described in this chapter. Later, hierarchical clustering techniques used to
obtain clusters of objects given the similarities between them are discussed.
2.1 Modified Smith-Waterman algorithm
The original Smith-Waterman algorithm was suggested by T.F. Smith and M.S. Wa-
terman (1981). Its objective was to identify the longest homologous subsequences
within a collection of large sequences. The algorithm finds "a pair of segments, one
from each of two long sequences, such that there is no other pair of segments with
greater similarity (homology)" [Smith and Waterman, 1981].
19
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In alarms the time stamp should be taken into account. It is more important the
proximity in time of the alarms than the exact order of occurrence.
In [Cheng et al., 2013] Y. Cheng et al. developed an algorithm based on Smith-
Waterman to calculate a similarity index between two alarm flood sequences. They
pointed out that it could occur that a group of linked alarms are triggered practically
simultaneously and their order of appearance is random. Therefore, when analysing
alarm sequences the exact order of occurrence of the alarms is not as important as
their proximity in time.
The algorithm presented in the paper [Cheng et al., 2013] will be refered as
the Modified Smith-Waterman (MSW) algorithm in this thesis. Its main advantages
against other algorithms is that it takes into account the time stamp of the alarm
occurrence and it blurs the order of the alarms in the sequence when they occur
close in time. This clear advantage of the MSW is the main reason for its use in the
present work.
The Algorithm The Smith-Waterman algorithm identifies the local sequence
alignment of a pair of sequences with the highest similarity. Before explaining the
algorithm let’s explain what a local alignment is. Given two symbolic sequences, a
segment of each of them can be extracted. The number of elements of the segments
can be equalized by inserting gaps ("-") in one or both of them. For each symbol
of one of the segments there is a symbol at the same position in the other segment.
This is called a local alignment of the two sequences.
For example, from a couple of symbolic sequences:
Sequence1 : 3,2,5,6,3,4,1,2
Sequence2 : 7,6,3,4,5,2,3,1,2,5
a pair of segments can be extracted:
A : 2,5,6,3,4,1,2
B : 7,6,3,4,5,2
an alignment of these segments could be:
A1 :−,2,5,6,3,4,1,2
B1 : 7,6,−,3,4,5,−,2
or
A2 : 2,5,6,3,4,1,2
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B2 :−,7,6,3,4,5,2
In both cases the two aligned segments have the same length (8 for the first
case and 7 for the second). Then, each symbol in one of the aligned segments has
a corresponding symbol in the aligned segment of the other sequence for the same
position. These couple of symbols are called symbolic pairs of the alignment. For
instance, (2,6) or (5,-) are symbolic pairs of the local alignment A1−B1.
For a pair of sequences there exist multiple possible alignments. Therefore, to
identify the local sequence alignment that is the most similar, a scoring system is
required. For each symbolic pair (x,y) a similarity score is calculated. In the original
Smith-Waterman algorithm the score of a symbolic pair is:
• a negative number δ when the symbolic pair has a gap
• a positive number α (usually 1) when the symbols are the same
• a negative number µ when the symbols are different
The similarity score of the local sequence alignment is the sum of the similarity
scores of its symbolic pairs. For instance, for the alignment:
A2 : 2,5,6,3,4,1,2
B2 :−,7,6,3,4,5,2
if we choose δ = −0.4, α = 1 and µ = −0.6, the similarity score of the align-
ment is:
δ +µ+α+α+α+µ+α =−0.4−0.6+1+1+1−0.6+1 = 2.4
Then the alignment with the highest similarity score is the optimal alignment
and its score is the similarity score between the two sequences.
However, an alarm sequence is different from a symbolic sequence in that an
alarm is defined by an alarm type and a time stamp. If the alphabet of alarm types is:
Σ= 1,2, ...,K
An alarm sequence can be defined as:
A = a1,a2, ...,aM
am = (em, tm),m = 1,2, ...,M
where em is the alarm type, an integer between 1 and K, and tm is the time stamp.
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In [Cheng et al., 2013] a new similarity score for a pair of alarm occurrences
with time stamp is defined. The new similarity score uses two new concepts "time
distance vector" and "time weight vector".
For each alarm occurrence in an alarm sequence a time distance vector is defined
as follows:
dm = [d1m,d2m, ...,dKm ]T , for k = 1,2, ...,K
dkm =
{
min
1≤i≤M
{|tm− ti| : ei = k}, if the set is not empty
∞, otherwise
(2.1)
dkm is then the time interval between the mth alarm occurrence and the closest
alarm occurrence of type k. If the alarm sequence has no alarm of the type k then
the value is ∞. And demm will always be 0.
The time weight vector is defined as follows:
wm = [w1m,w2m, ...,wKm]T = [ f (d1m), f (d2m), ..., f (dKm)]T
where f () :R→R is a time weighting function with respect to the time distance.
The function has to satisfy:
1. Monotically decerasing on the positive axis
2. f (0) = 1, f (∞) = 0
In [Cheng et al., 2013] the authors use a scaled Gaussian function as the time
weighting function for the first sequence, the same function is used in the present
work:
f (x) = e−x2/2σ2
for the second sequence, the following function is used:
f (x) =
{
0, i f x 6= 0
1, i f x = 0 (2.2)
However in our case study some alarms that occur exactly at the same time.
If this last function was used for the second sequence together with the Gaussian
for the first, some alarm matching will be counted twice. In order to avoid this, the
weighting vector will be computed as follows:
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wkm =
{
0, i f em 6= k
1, i f em = k
(2.3)
In [Cheng et al., 2013] a new similarity score between two alarm occurrences
((ea, ta),(eb, tb)) was defined as follows:
s((ea, ta),(eb, tb)) = max
1≤k≤K
{wka×wkb}(1−µ)+µ (2.4)
2.2 Agglomerative Hierarchical Clustering
The goal of a clustering analysis is to group items into different sets or clusters,
maximizing the similarities among items within the same cluster while minimizing
the similarities among items within different clusters [Cai et al., 2014].
Clustering analysis is used in many applications, for instance: data compres-
sion, analysis of gene expression data, anomaly detection, structuring results of
search engines [Ackermann et al., 2012], improve the structure of network systems
[Seema and Coyle, 2003], organisms classification [Williams, 1975]...
Agglomerative Clustering is one of the most widely used and earliest ap-
proaches. It is a bottom-up clustering process where each input item forms its own
cluster at the beginning [Ackermann et al., 2012]. Before starting the clustering
algorithm, similarities (or distances) between all possible pairs of items have to
be known. In each iteration of the clustering process the two clusters that are the
most similar (or have the least distance between them) are merged. This process
continues until either just one cluster remains or when the similarities between the
clusters are lower than a defined minimum.
The results of the agglomerative hierarchical clustering are usually shown by
a dendrogram, which lists all the items and at what level of similarity they where
merged. An example of a dendrogram is shown in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1 Dendogram
In the dendrogram shown, the vertical axis represents the dissimilarity between
two clusters. Each fusion of two clusters is represented by the merging of two
vertical lines (horizontal line), the vertical position at which the two vertical lines
are merged into one gives the dissimilarity (or distance) between two clusters.
The dashed horizontal line represents the threshold set for stopping the clustering
algorithm. Looking at this dendrogram, one can see that Item5 and Item6 are the
most similar items, and therefore the first ones merging. After this Item1 and Item2
merge together, then Item3 merges with the cluster containing Item1 and Item2.
Later Item4 is added to this last cluster. Since the similarity between the clus-
ter consisting of Item5 and Item6 has a similarity (dissimilarity) with the cluster
formed by Item1, Item2, Item3 and Item4 lower (higher) than the threshold, these
two clusters are not merged.
As mentioned before, in each iteration (when two clusters merge) the similarity
between the new cluster and the rest is updated. There are different strategies to cal-
culate the similarity between clusters. The most frequently used are the following:
• Single linkage
• Complete linkage
• Average linkage
In single− linkage clustering the similarity of two clusters is the similarity of
their most similar member. A and B being two clusters, the similarity between them
is defined as:
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S(A,B) = max{S(a,b) : a ∈ A,b ∈ B} (2.5)
In complete− linkage clustering the similarity of two clusters is the similarity
between their most dissimilar members.
S(A,B) = min{S(a,b) : a ∈ A,b ∈ B} (2.6)
In average− linkage clustering the similarity of two clusters is the average of
the similarities between their members.
S(A,B) =
∑
a∈A
∑
b∈B
S(a,b)
|A||B| (2.7)
where |A| is the number of items in cluster A.
Figure 2.2 (a) Single Linkage, (b) Complete Linkage, (c) Average Linkage
For better understanding an example is shown in Figure 2.2. Two clusters with
two items each are displayed. The numbers above the arrow represent the similarity
index between the two items connected by the arrow. If single− linkage clustering
is used the similarity between the two clusters will be 0.7 (Figure 2.2a). If
complete− linkage clustering is used, the similarity between the clusters will
be 0.3 (Figure 2.2b). Finally if average− linkage clustering is used, the similarity
will be calculated as follows:
S(A,B) = 0.7+0.5+0.3+0.44 = 0.475
A simple HAC (Hierarchical Agglomerative Clustering) algorithm is shown
below:
Input: N×N similarity matrix S, where N is the number of items and a thresh-
old τ .
1. Assign a cluster for each item
2. Find the most similar clusters and merge them
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3. Compute the similarity index between the new cluster and the rest and update
the similarity matrix. The size of S becomes N−1×N−1
4. Repeat step 2 to step 3 until maxS > τ or N = 1
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Root-cause analysis based
on Process Data
As stated in Chapter 1, nowadays industrial plants present a high level of inter-
connectivity due to the multiple material, information and energy connections.
Presence of a plant-wide disturbances is a common situation, however their cause is
difficult to diagnose [Yuan and Qin, 2014]. During the past few years several meth-
ods for process data analysis have been developed in order to find the root-causes
of plant-wide disturbances. In [Thornhill, 2005] a method that analyses process
signals to distinguish the root-cause of an plant-wide oscillation from the propa-
gated secondary oscillations is suggested. T. Yuan et. al propose Granger causality
and spectral Granger causality to provide cause and effect relationships between
time series. Margaret Bauer et al. present in [Bauer et al., 2007] a method used
to identify the direction of propagation of disturbances based on the probability
density function measuring the directionality of variation.
In this thesis a Plant-wide Disturbance Analysis software tool (PDA) developed
at ABB is used to perform a data-driven root-cause analysis. A brief description of
the tool and the methods on which it is based is presented in this chapter.
However one must take into account that even though the methods used by PDA
are regarded as techniques that analyse causality, they may not capture true causality
since they are pairwise methods [Fang Yang, 2012]. In this thesis the expression
causality analysis is used since it is the term used in both industrial and research
communities, however one should keep in mind that it is actually a precedence
analysis.
3.1 PDA
PDA is a software tool developed by ABB used for plant-wide disturbance analysis.
It is based on the methods representing the state of the art for the analysis of upsets
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and disturbances in process plants.
The data-driven analysis performed by PDA has basically four steps:
1. Data preprocessing
2. Data filtering
3. Clustering
4. Root cause analysis
In the first step, data that is not suitable for the analysis is removed, these can
be compressed data or data with missing values or non numerical entries. In the
second step, the user can apply filters available in the tool to select the desired signal
spectral range for the analysis. The different signal tags included in the analysis are
clustered in step three. Finally, root cause analysis is performed for the different
clusters in step four.
PDA uses two different methods to cluster signals based on:
• Similarity of oscillation indices
• Principal component analysis of spectral data
Regarding root-cause analysis the tool presents two sections of results:
• Non-linearity index
• Time delay of cross correlation function and transfer entropy
The different clustering and root-cause analysis methods are briefly described
in the following subsections.
3.1.1 Oscillation detection
PDA is based on the method presented in [Thornhill et al., 2003a] to detect oscilla-
tions in signals and cluster them. The method is based on the zero crossings of the
autocovariance function (ACF). The main advantage of using ACF instead of using
directly the time trend relies on the fact that (white) noise that can cause spurious
zero crossings in the latter is removed when using the ACF. This is due to the fact
that the ACF of the white noise is theoretically zero for lags greater than zero.
Those signals whose ACF have regular oscillations and whose average oscil-
lation periods are similar enough are cluster together. For additional information
about the method and the clustering algorithm see [Thornhill et al., 2003a].
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3.1.2 Spectral analysis
In PDA, principal component analysis is applied to the power spectra of the signals
in order to identify their features. Power spectra is invariant to time delays caused
by plant dynamics, therefore it is possible to cluster signals having similar spectral
components even if they are delayed in time. Defining X as a matrix whose rows
are the power spectra of the different measurements for a range of frequencies up
to the Nyquist frequency (one half of the sampling period). PCA decomposition
reconstructs the matrix X as a sum over a basis functions wi which are spectrum-
like functions.
X=∑ ti ·wi+E (3.1)
where E is the error matrix that captures the variation of X that is not covered
by the mode and ti are the scores.
PCA maps each row vector of X to a specific coordinate in the score plot. Then
those signals with common spectra signatures will be isolated since they will be
close in the score plot.
3.1.3 Non-linear root-cause
The goal of the non-linear root-cause method is to isolate the signal closest to the
root-cause within a cluster of oscillating signals.
The idea behind this technique is that oscillations are commonly caused by the
presence of non-linearities in the system (limit cycles). These non-linearities are
attenuated as they propagate through the plant since the assets in the plant act as
a low pass filter. Therefore, the measurement closest to the root-cause will have a
higher non-linearity index.
PDA computes a numerical non-linearity index for each signal [Thornhill et al.,
2003b]. Then the signals within the cluster are presented in an ordered list with the
measurement with the highest non-linearity index (closest to the root-cause) on top.
3.1.4 Causality analysis
PDA allows the use of two different techniques to perform causality analysis, these
are, Time delay analysis and Transfer entropy.
Time delay analysis
This method detects the precedence relationship between two signals using the
cross-correlation function (CCF).
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The idea here is that when a disturbance spreads in a process plant, several
signals are affected. However not all signals are affected simultaneously as the
disturbance needs some time to propagate form one signal to another. Therefore,
the earlier a signal is affected by the disturbance the closer it is to the root-cause.
The CCF measures similarities between two time trends for different time lags
between them. The time lag for which the cross-correlation reaches its maximum is
the time lag for which the two time trend are best aligned. Then if two signals are
delayed, this time lag will correspond to the time delay between them.
Transfer Entropy
Transfer entropy is a data-driven method proposed by Schreiber [Schreiber,
2000] which uses conditional probability density functions to identify precedence
relationships between process variables.
These relationships are used to determine the direction in which a disturbance
propagates between the different signals and to help finding the root-cause of this
disturbance.
Other methods analyse the time delay between two measurements to identify
the directionality. However, time lags are difficult to identify when the signals are
oscillatory or noisy. Furthermore, if the delay is smaller than the sampling time of
the process data, the causality relationship cannot be determined. Transfer entropy
gives solution to these problems, it uses transition probabilities to estimate the
amount of information transferred from one signal to another.
Some steps are followed to extract the causal relationships with this method:
1. Estimation of the joint PDFs (Probability Density Function), using a Kernel
estimator
2. Calculate transition probabilities
3. Calculate transfer entropy values
4. Construction of the causal map
Estimation of joint PDFs
For the computation of the transfer entropy a probability density function from
the time series corresponding to the process signals must be estimated. In this case
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a Gaussian Kernel function is used:
pˆ(x,y) = 1N ∑K(x− xi,y− yi)
Where K is the Gaussian Kernel function, N is the number of samples in the
time series x and y, and pˆ(x,y) is its joint probability estimation.
Transition Probabilities
The transition probability can be obtained through joint PDFs as it follows:
p(xi+h|xi,yi) = p(xi+h,xi,yi)p(xi,yi)
p(xi+h|xi,yi) denotes the probability that a future value xi+h has a specific
value when past values xi = [xi,xi−τ , ...,xi−(k−1)τ ] and yi = [yi,yi−τ , ...,yi−(k−1)τ ]
are known.
Transfer entropy
The measure of transfer entropy is defined by Schreiber [ref 5] as follows:
t(x|y) = ∑ p(xi+h,yi,xi) · log p(xi+h|yi,xi)p(xi+h|xi)
The logarithm represents a comparison between the probability of xi+h know-
ing the past observations x and y (numerator) and the probability of xi+h knowing
the past values x (denominator). If knowing past values of y does not affect the
probability, that means that no information is transferred from y to x. In this case
numerator and denominator will be the same and the logarithm will become, and
then t(x|y) will become 0.
The causality is obtained when comparing the information transferred from x to
y with the information transferred from y to x.
tx→y = t(y|x)− t(x|y)
If tx→y is positives that means that more information is transferred from x to y,
and therefore x caused y. If tx→y is negative, then information is transferred from
y to x, and therefore y caused x. If tx→y has a value close to 0, then the causality
cannot be deduced.
Transfer entropy is a quantitative process history-based method that allows us
to identify the direction of propagation of disturbances. Its main advantages is that
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it is a model free method and that it can determine directionality even in absence of
time delay.
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Connectivity analysis based
on Plant Topology
On the last three decades fault diagnosis in the chemical industry has been the focus
of many research groups [Gao et al., 2010]. Qualitative model based methods, i. e.,
methods based on some fundamental understanding of the process that captures the
structure of a system, have been used to identify the source of a disturbance.
Among these methods, graphs have drawn more attention and have been im-
proved in the past years. In the present work, graphs are used to represent the plant
connectivity and to automatically explore relationships between assets to validate
the root-cause analysis results obtained from a pure data-driven analysis.
This chapter describes the use of graphs for exploring the connectivity of a pro-
cess plant. First, a short introduction to graph theory is provided. Later, the applica-
tion of graph theory to causality analysis verification is explored. Finally, the chapter
looks into the concept of intelligent P&IDs (Process and Instrumentation Diagrams)
and the problem of transforming legacy topology data into computer interpretable
formalized topology models.
4.1 Graphs in fault diagnosis
Physical systems can be represented qualitatively with graphs. Directed graphs (di-
graphs or DG) and signed directed graphs (SDG) are used to capture connectivity
relationships between elements and have been widely applied to chemical process
fault diagnosis [Venkatasubramanian et al., 2003]. Directed graphs are represented
as graph nodes in which the precedence relationship between nodes is represented
by directed arcs. In SDGs the arcs between nodes not only define the direction of
the precedence relationship but also the sign of this relationship. The arcs have a
positive or negative sign attached to them depending on whether a change on one of
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the nodes results in a change in the same direction or opposite direction respectively
in the other node.
4.1.1 Graph Fundamentals
A graph G = (V,E) consists of a set of objects V = v1,v2... called vertices or nodes
and a set E = e1,e2... whose elements are called edges. Each edge is identified
with an unordered (undirected graphs) or ordered (directed graph) pair of vertices
(vi,v j). In the case of signed directed graphs, a sign "+" or "-" representing positive
or negative influence respectively is assigned to the edge.
Figure 4.1 shows examples of an undirected graph (a) and a directed graph (b).
1 3 4
2
1 3 4
2
Figure 4.1 Graphical representation of an undirected graph (a) and a directed graph
(b).
There exist two standard ways of representing undirected and directed graph
G = (V,E) in a computer: using adjacency lists or a connectivity matrix.
The adjacency list representation of a graph consists of an array with |V | lists,
one for each vertex or node in the graph. The list corresponding to a vertex u con-
tains all vertices v for which exists an edge (u,v)∈ E. Figure 4.2 (a) is an adjacency
list representation of the undirected graph in Figure 4.1 (a) and Figure 4.3 (a) is an
adjacency list representation of the directed graph in Figure 4.1 (b).
The connectivity matrix, assuming V = 1,2, ..., |V |, consists of a |V |×|V |matrix
A = (ai j) such that
ai j =
{
1, i f (i, j) ∈ E
0, otherwise (4.1)
Figures 4.2 (b) and 4.3 (b) are the connectivity matrices of the undirected and
directed graphs in Figures 4.1 (a) and (b) respectively.
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1
1
3
3
4
(a) Undirected Graph
0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0
(b) Directed Graph
Figure 4.2 Two representations of the undirected graph in Figure 4.1.
(a)Adjacency list (b) Connectivity matrix
2	  
2	   3	  1	  
2	  
3	  
4	  
1	  
[█■0&1&1&0@1&0&1&0@1&1&0&1@0&0&1&0 ]	  
1	  
3	  
3	  
4	  
4	  
2	   3	  1	  
2	  
3	  
4	  
2	  
[█■0&1&1&0@0&0&0&0@0&1&0&1@0&0&0&0 ]	  
V1	   TC	  QC	  
V1	  
T	  
TC	  
V1	  
QC	   T	  
V1	  
TC	  
(a) Undirected Graph
0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0
(b) Directed Graph
Figure 4.3 Two representations of the directed graph in Figure 4.1. (a)Adjacency
list (b) Connectivity matrix
4.1.2 Graphs and causality analysis in process plants
For the purpose of diagnostic reasoning, to validate the root-cause of a disturbance
propagating in a process plant, a directed graph representing the connectivity of the
plant can be built with qualitative knowledge of the plant. Each node represents an
asset in the plant (indicators, controllers, vessels, valves...) and the edges symbolize
the existence of connection between the assets. An edge ek = (vi,v j) symbolizes
that there is a material or information connection from asset i to asset j.
For example, consider a quenching process as shown in Figure 4.4, where QC
is a quenching column, V1 a valve regulating the inflow of quenching liquid into
the quenching column, T1 the tank where the quenching liquid is kept. The hot gas
enters the quenching column where it is cooled by direct contact with the quenching
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liquid. TC is the controller measuring the temperature at the output of the quench-
ing column and opening/closing V1 accordingly. Solid lines represent pipes, while
dashed lines represent information links.
A DG is built from process knowledge, Figure 4.5 (a). Pipes are not considered
nodes for simplicity. They will be seen as material links between assets. In case
a controller or an indicator is attached to a pipe, a link between the measurement
point and the asset upstream the pipe is set instead. Furthermore, material links
are considered bidirectional, while information links are considered unidirectional.
Even though one asset is located downstream of another, a change of certain prop-
erties such as pressure or temperature in the asset downstream can affect the asset
upstream. As for the information links, an indicator is affected by the asset whose
property is measuring. However, the a change in the state of the indicator (such as
malfunctioning) does not affect the asset. Therefore, information connections are
considered unidirectional.
V1
QC
TC
T1
Figure 4.4 Schema of a quench process
An adjacency list representation of the graph in Figure 4.5 (a) is presented in
Figure 4.5 (b). In this work, adjacency lists have been chosen over connectivity
matrices since regularly plant process graphs are sparse, i.e., |E| is considerably
less than |V |2. For sparse graphs, adjacency lists require less storage space because
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they onliy need to represent those connections that not present.
QC V1 T
TC
(a)
V1 TCQC
V1
T
TC
V1
QC T
V1
TC
(b)
Figure 4.5 (a) Graphical representation of schema in Figure 4.4. (b) Adjacency list
representation of the graph in (a)
Once a graph that captures the plant connectivity is built, the next step is to ex-
plore the information contained in it. Two well established graph-search algorithms
are Breadth-first search and Depth-first search.
Breadth-first search This algorithm explores exhaustively a graph by using a first
in first out (FIFO) approach in a queue storing nodes. The algorithm starts at a spec-
ified starting node s, it places it into the queue and then it explores all its adjacent
nodes and adds them to the queue, then the starting node is removed from the queue.
Later all unexplored nodes adjacent to the next node in the queue are stored in the
queue and the node is removed. This procedure is repeated untill the queue is empty.
Depth First Search Depth first search uses instead a last in first out (LIFO)
approach. The algorithm places in the queue the starting node, then one of the
undiscovered adjacent nodes is explored exhaustively until a node that has no un-
explored adjacent nodes is reached. Finally, the search backtracks to the previous
node visited to explore any of its undiscovered adjacent nodes.
Following [Thambirajah et al., 2009], plant connectivity is used to validate the
result from a pure data-driven analysis. The suggested root-causes obtained from
the data analysis are specified as starting nodes and all possible paths starting from
the hypothetical root-causes are explored. In this way, it can be determined whether
there is a feasible path between the suggested root-cause and the other disturbed el-
ements. If just a small proportion of the disturbed assets is found to be connected to
one of the root-cause suggestions, chances are high that this element is not the root-
cause. Then, spurious results from the data-driven analysis are ruled out [Thambi-
rajah et al., 2009].
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4.2 Intelligent P&IDs
P&ID stands for Piping and Instrumentation Diagram. P&IDs play a crucial role in
the design and maintenance of process plants. It is a drawing of the process showing
the instrument details and their connectivity as well as the control schemes. A vast
amount of engineering data and information is stored in these graphical represen-
tations. However, an automatic extraction of this information is hard to manage
directly from the graphical representation.
In order to facilitate data exchange across different systems new formats and
schemas have been developed. XML (eXtensible Markup Language) is a markup
language for documents containing structured information created for this purpose.
XML provides a flexible way to create common information formats that can be
used by any group of individuals that want to share information in a consistent and
platform independent manner. XML was rapidly adopted as the meta data format
for electronic commerce applications. It provided a "common ground" for indepen-
dent entities to easily exchange data to conduct business [Li, 2000]. Examples of it
are the construction industry for data interchange related to resources, activities and
transportation (AecXML,TransXML) [AGDAS and ELLIS, 2010] and the chemical
industry for buying, selling and deliverying chemicals (Chem eStandard).
XML has been recently used in the so called intelligent P&IDs (iP&IDs).
iP&IDs are representations of the plant in a computer available format that include
not only the traditional plant drawings but also additional information about the
assets, their connectivity and their layout. CAEX (Computer Aided Engineering
eXchange) is a vendor independent object-oriented data exchange format based on
the XML schema that has been used in the past years for structuring plant topology
data in a flexible and expandable way (see e.g. [Schleburg et al., 2013], [Thambira-
jah et al., 2009], [Schleipen et al., 2008]). It has been developed in cooperation with
the Chair of Process Control Engineering of the RWTH Aachen and the Research
Center of ABB, and it is standardized in IEC 62424 [IEC, 2008].
In order to efficiently define objects and their connectivity, CAEX adopts three
libraries: SystemUnitClassLib, RoleClassLib and InterfaceClassLib. Plant elements
are represented as nodes called InternalElements. Each InternalElement is an
instance of a SystemUnitClass, which defines a template of a specific plant compo-
nent, and has a reference to a role class, which defines functional attributes and in-
terface information. The material, energy or information connections between plant
elements are defined as Interfaces and the different types of interfaces are contained
in the InterfaceClassLib. Finally, the plant is described in the InstanceHierarchy,
where the different classes are instantiated, referenced and interconnected to shape
the topology model of the plant.
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In the following simplified example, a section of an InstanceHierarchy describes
a system consisting of a temperature indicator connected to a quenching column:
<InternalElement Name="QuenchingColumn"
RefBaseSystemUnitPath="SystemUnitLib/Vessel"
ID="QuenchingColumn">
<Attribute Name="_Height">
<Value>400</Value>
</Attribute>
<Attribute Name="_Diameter">
<Value>312</Value>
</Attribute>
...
<ExternalInterface Name="Info_MeasurementPoint1"
RefBaseClassPath="InterfaceLib/InformationConnector"
ID="Info_MeasurementPoint1" />
<RoleRequirements RefBaseRoleClassPath="RoleLib/Volume" />
</InternalElement>
<InternalElement Name="TI1"
RefBaseSystemUnitPath="SystemUnitLib/ContinuousSensor"
ID="TI1">
<Attribute Name="_MeasuringUnit" />
<Value>"K"</Value>
</Attribute>
...
<ExternalInterface Name="Info_LogicalNozzle1"
RefBaseClassPath="InterfaceLib/InformationConnector"
ID="Info_LogicalNozzle1" />
<RoleRequirements RefBaseRoleClassPath="RoleLib/Sensor" />
</InternalElement>
<InternalLink Name="Link1"
RefPartnerSideA="Info_MeasurementPoint1"
RefPartnerSideB="Info_LogicalNozzle1"
ID="Link1" />
The first element of the example is an InternalElement representing the quench-
ing column. The internal element is defined by Name, ID and its SystemUnitLib
class. Later, attributes of the quenching columns (height, diameter...) and its role
class are specified. The InternalElement QuenchingColumn is an instance of the
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class Vessel and has a reference to the role Volume.
The next InternalElement is the temperature indicator. In this case, the element
is an instance of the class ContinuousSensor and has a reference to the role Sensor.
The information connection between the two elements is performed by defining
an ExternalInterface of the type InformationConnector inside the InternalElement
describing the assets and then connect them with an InternalLink. The InternalLink
describes the directional link between the assets. RefPartnerSideA refers to the el-
ement from which the link is originated and RefPartnerSideB refers to the element
where the link terminates. In this case the link goes from Info_LogicalNozzle1
(QuenchingColumn) to Info_MeasurementPoint1 (TI1), representing an informa-
tion connection going from the quenching column to the sensor.
4.2.1 Conversion of P&IDs into iP&IDs
The research community sometimes assumes the availability of plant topology
descriptions in a computer interpretable formalized representation. However, the
reality is far from this assumption. Usually P&IDs are still exchanged on a paper
base or portable document format (.pdf) where no additional information besides
the graphical symbols and arcs is included. The reason for this could be that the
process plant was designed using traditional CAD drawing tools and then there is no
additional information available, or that the companies fear to loose the know-how
to other companies.
Finding methods to automatically or semi-automatically upgrade legacy data
to the new formats has become a relevant matter in the process industry. That is
the reason why several CAD vendors have put effort on developing software tools
in order to facilitate the conversion. SmartPlant® offers a migration utility called
Import Assistant that supports the conversion of P&IDs created in AutoCAD, Mi-
croStation and PDS®2D to SmartPlant P&IDs. CADWorx also offers a tool that
makes easier to connect legacy P&ID’s components to project databases.
In this thesis the availabilitz of an intelligent P&ID in CAEX format is assumed.
In case an intelligent P&ID is not provided a transformation tool will be used to
create the computer readable topologz model.
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This chapter describes an original approach to reduce alarm flood periods in process
plants. The steps of the method will be detailed in the sections of this chapter.
The proposed approach relies on two assumptions:
• Alarm floods are the result of an abnormality propagating in the process
through material, energy or control connections.
• If two alarm flood sequences are similar enough, then they originate from the
same source.
Regarding the first hypothesis, it was stated before in Chapter 2 that the focus
of this thesis is on the reduction of consequential alarms. The reduction of repetitive
alarms or standing alarms have been widely investigated, and methods to remove
them are already available and well established (e.g. [EEMUA-191, 2007],[Hugo,
2009],[Ahnlund et al., 2003]). In this thesis the alarm floods of interest are those
caused by an irregularity spreading through the plant due to its high level of inter-
connectivity.
As for the second hypothesis, if two alarm flood sequences share a common pat-
tern and a big portion of the alarm occurrences in the alarm floods are in this pattern,
it is very likely that both alarm floods are the result of the same process abnormality.
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The objective of the proposed approach is to reduce alarm floods in process
plants by grouping consequential alarms originating from the same cause and to
give a suggestion of the "causal" alarm.
The method consists of five basic steps:
1. Remove chattering alarms
2. Identify alarm flood time-periods
3. Cluster alarm flood sequences
4. Mapping
5. Root-cause analysis
The first three steps correspond to the alarm log analysis stage. In the first step
chattering alarms will be removed from the alarm log. In the second step, alarm
flood time periods are isolated and alarm flood sequences are constructed. In the
third step, similarity indices between sequences are computed and the alarm se-
quences are clustered according to them. Each cluster represents a process abnor-
mality and the alarm sequences in the cluster are the periods where the abnormality
occurred. The forth step of the method sets the connection between the alarm, the
process signals and assets’ tag names. Finally, on the fifth step a precedence analysis
is performed to isolate the "causal" alarm in the alarm flood sequence.
5.1 Remove Chattering alarms
In industrial process alarm management systems of industrial processes there usu-
ally exist a large amount of nuisance alarms. The most common type of "nuisance
alarms" are the so called "chattering and repetitive" alarms [EEMUA-191, 2007].
Chattering alarms are defined by the industrial standard ISA-18.2 (2009) as alarms
that "repeatedly transition between the alarm state and the normal state in a short
period of time". About 10 to 60% of the alarm occurrences are due to chattering
and repetitive alarms [Rothenberg, 2009]. The most common causes of chattering
alarms are [Kabir et al., 2013]:
• The presence of noise in the process measurements.
• The process variable corresponding to the alarm is operating at a critical value
very close to the alarm limit.
If chattering alarms are not removed prior to the alarm flood analysis, we may
find time intervals with a large amount of alarms where most of the alarm occur-
rences are chattering alarms, as exemplified in Figure 5.1.
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The X axis of the plots in Figure 5.1 represents time, and is divided into in-
tervals of 10 min. The Y axis shows the number of alarm occurrences within each
interval of 10 min. In Figure 5.1, left side the removal of chattering alarms is not
performed. While for the plot on the rightside, chattering alarms are removed. It
can clearly be seen that on this example, chattering alarms have a great contribution
on the count of alarms, and these nuisance alarms are causing some of the intervals
to have a relatively high number of alarms.
Figure 5.1 Chattering alarm example (a) Original alarm log and (b) Alarm log
after chattering alarm removal
In the ISA 18.2 it is not specified whether chattering alarms should be included
within the 10 alarms per 10 minutes threshold that defines an alarm flood. However,
since the present work focuses on analysing consequential alarms, chattering alarms
are removed before proceeding with the analysis. The alarm analysis focuses on
alarm floods involving consequential alarm sequences.
Methods for chattering alarms removal have been widely investigated by both
academic and industrial communities. Several methods for handling this type of
nuisance alarms have been developed. In [EEMUA-191, 2007], it is suggested to
use filtering, dead-band, delay timer and shelving as mechanisms to remove chatter-
ing alarms. More complex methods have been proposed, Hugo [Hugo, 2009] uses
time-series modelling to estimate alarm deadbands to remove chattering alarms. In
[Naghoosi et al., 2011] the authors propose a method to estimate the optimal alarm
threshold taking into account the dead-band and the process variable characteristics
in order to reduce the amount of chattering. In [Wang and Chen, 2014], the authors
present two rules to detect chattering alarms caused by random noise and suggest a
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method for online removal using m-sample delay timer.
Developing a method for reduction of chattering alarms is outside the scope of
this thesis. However, it is a required step to isolate the time intervals of interest. A
simple method will be used for this purpose. The method used is the one suggested
in [Ahmed, 2011].
In order to remove chattering alarms, a period of time will be defined and if
the time between two alarm occurrences of the same type is lower than the chosen
interval, the second alarm occurrence will be removed. The interval length chosen
for this thesis is 10 min, based on the definition of alarm flood.
The algorithm implemented in our tool for removing chattering alarms is de-
scribed in Figure 5.2.
No
Alarm log Take next alarm 
occurrence
Type already been 
encountered?
Save time stamp in its 
corresponding type in the table  
Yes
Δt to the occurrence 
saved >10min
Yes
No
Erase alarm 
occurrence
Figure 5.2 Chattering alarms’ removal algorithm
A table with two columns is created. In the first column all alarm types are listed
and in the second the time stamps of the last alarm occurrence of the corresponding
type that has not been removed are saved. Each alarm occurrence in the alarm log is
analysed. First, if its alarm type has not be encountered yet, its time stamp is saved
in the second column in the row corresponding to its alarm type. If the alarm type
of the alarm occurrence that is being analysed has already been encountered and
if the difference in time between its time stamp and the time stamp saved in the
table is smaller than 10 min, the alarm occurrence is removed. Otherwise the time
stamp of that alarm type in the table is substituted by the alarm stamp of the current
occurrence, and the alarm occurrence is not erased from the alarm log.
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5.2 Identification of alarm flood periods
Once chattering alarm occurrences are filtered out, the next step is to isolate those
time-periods where alarm floods occur and construct the corresponding alarm flood
sequences.
The alarm log is divided into intervals of 10 min. And those intervals with
more alarm occurrences than a specified threshold are highlighted. The threshold
(τ) will be chosen taking into account that an alarm flood is defined as more than
10 alarms per 10 min and operator. In process plants one can find alarm floods that
take few minutes and others that last several hours. In order to identify an alarm
floods regardless of its duration consecutive intervals with more alarm occurrences
than the specified threshold are merged.
Since the alarm log is discretised, it can occur that the beginning or the end of
an alarm flood sequence is cut out. For instance, considering a threshold equal to
10, an alarm flood sequence consisting of 20 alarms triggering within 10 min could
be split apart when the log is divided into intervals of 10 min. The first 5 alarms
might be contained in one interval and the other 15 in the following. If just those
intervals with more than 10 alarms are considered, the first 5 alarms will not be
taken into account, then part of the alarm sequence will be lost. For this study it is
very important not to lose part of the sequence neither at the beginning, where the
alarm connected to the root-cause of the alarm flood might be, nor at the end, where
extra consequential alarms that can influence the alarm sequence clustering in step
three (see Chapter 3). For this reason, the interval before and after the consecutive
intervals with more than τ alarms are also taken into consideration.
The alarm flood sequences are built with the alarm occurrences within:
• Consecutive intervals with more than τ alarms occurrences.
• The time interval before.
• The time interval after.
An example of this process is shown in Figure 5.2 (τ = 10). In the upper part of
Figure 5.2 a section of an alarm log is displayed. The numbers above the intervals
represent the number of alarm occurrences in the intervals. In this section two con-
secutive intervals have more than 10 alarms, one containing 15 alarms and the other
14. Those two intervals are considered to build the alarm flood sequence. Then the
intervals before and after are added (depicted in orange in the picture). The alarm
occurrences within these four intervals form the alarm sequence corresponding to
this alarm flood episode.
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5.3 Cluster alarm flood sequences
Once the alarm flood periods are isolated and the alarm flood sequences are con-
structed, the next step is to cluster similar alarm floods sequences.
A similarity index is first computed for each pair of sequences. The similarity
index used in the present work is the one described in [Cheng et al., 2013]. As
stated above, when matching patterns in alarm sequences the proximity in time of
the alarms is more important than the exact order of occurrence because of uncer-
tainties. The MSW algorithm, summarized in Chapter 3, takes into account these
uncertainties by blurring the order of those alarms that occur close in time.
The main issue when using the Modified Smith Waterman algorithm is the
computation time. The time required to calculate the similarity index between two
sequences can be greater than 10 seconds, depending on the sequence length. Com-
puting the similarity index of all possible combinations of alarm flood sequences
46
5.3 Cluster alarm flood sequences
within an alarm log of half a year can easily take more than a day.
In order to overcome this problem, an initial stage is added where another al-
gorithm that is less precise but less time consuming can be used for pre-filtering. A
similar idea is used in [Ahmed, 2011]. The aim is to filter out those combinations of
alarm sequences that have low similarity, so that the MSW index is just calculated
for those combinations that are similar "enough".
A similarity matrix is built using these MSW similarity indexes. Later an ag-
glomerative hierarchical clustering algorithm is used to group similar alarm se-
quences. The work flow of the clustering step is shown in Figure 5.3 below and
is detailed in the sequel of this section.
Figure 5.3 Clustering of alarm flood sequences workflow
5.3.1 Pre-Filter
Given a pair of alarm sequences, these sequences are considered similar if they have
a high ratio of alarm types in common. If two alarm sequences have few alarms in
common the computation of the MSW similarity index is discarded. These combi-
nation pairs can be directly assigned a low similarity index.
In [Kabir et al., 2013], the Jaccard distance is used for this purpose. Let A and
B be two alarm sequences, the Jaccard distance between A and B is calculated as it
follows:
J(A,B) =
a+b
a+b+ c
(5.1)
a being the number of alarm types in A that B does not contain. b the number of
alarm types in B that A does not contain and c the number of alarms types contained
in both sequences.
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A threshold is set for the pre-filter. If the calculated Jaccard distance is greater
than the threshold value, this combination will be pre-assigned a high distance
value.
For the method described in this work, the pre-filter index is modified due to two
reasons. First, as the MSW algorithm calculates a similarity index not a distance
index, it is more convenient to use a similarity index for the pre-filter too. Second,
as mentioned above, to decide whether a pair of alarm sequences is filtered out or
not, a threshold must be set. The pre-filter similarity index chosen makes easier the
threshold selection as explained below.
In the Clustering alarm flood sequences step of this method, two thresholds
must be set: the pre-filter threshold and the clustering threshold. The first threshold
one decides whether a pair of alarm sequences is filtered out or not, the second
sets the stopping criteria of the clustering algorithm (i.e. if the maximum similarity
between clusters at a certain iteration in the clustering method is lower than the
threshold, the algorithm stops). The choice of these threshold values is interrelated:
for a specific clustering threshold if the pre-filter threshold is set too high there
may be combinations of alarm sequences that have a MSW similarity index big
enough for being clustered, but their pre-filter similarity index is too low to pass
the pre-filter. To avoid this situation, one possibility could be to set the pre-filter
threshold very low. However, in this case, the computational time increases and
the benefits of using a pre-filter are lost. An alternative solution is to make the
pre-filter and the MSW similarity indexes comparable. If one could insure that
SIpre f ilter ≥ SIMSW , then for a given clustering threshold if the pre-filter threshold is
set to be equal or smaller than the clustering threshold, all pairs of alarms that have
a MSW similarity index high enough to be clustered together, will pass the pre-filter.
To illustrate this, assume the clustering threshold is set to a value of 0.5 and two
alarm sequences have a MSW similarity index of 0.6 (and should therefore should
be clustered). Setting the pre-filter threshold to a value of 0.5 or lower assures that
this pair is not filtered out. Let be α the clustering threshold and β the pre-filter
threshold, the following relation holds:
β ≤ α = 0.5 ≤ SIMSW = 0.6 ≤ SIpre f ilter
Given two alarm sequences A and B a similarity index that meets this require-
ment is:
SIpre f ilter(A,B) =
|A∩B|
max(|A|, |B|) (5.2)
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The numerator represents number of common alarm occurrences in both se-
quences. And the denominator is the number of alarm occurrences of the longest
sequence (the similarity index is normalized between 0 and 1).
The pre-filtering substep is summarized in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4 Pre-filtering workflow
5.3.2 Similarity Matrix
After filtering out the combinations of alarm sequences that are not similar enough,
the MSW similarity index is computed for the remaining combinations and a simi-
larity matrix is built. The similarity matrix is an N×N symmetric matrix (N being
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the number of alarm sequences). It contains the similarity indices for all combina-
tions of alarm sequences. The value of an element [i, j] in the matrix is the similarity
index computed between the alarm sequence i and the alarm sequence j.
The MSW similarity index of the dismissed combinations is assumed to be a
low number (zero was used for the case study). The diagonal entries of the matrix
should have a value of one since the similarity index between a sequence with itself
is one. However, in order to avoid the clustering algorithm to cluster a sequence
with itself the values in the diagonal are forced to be zero.
In Figure 5.5 a portion of a similarity matrix can be seen:
Figure 5.5 Portion of a similarity matrix example
5.3.3 Agglomerative hierarchical clustering
The clustering method used in this thesis is the agglomerative hierarchical clus-
tering. At each iteration, the clustering algorithm accesses the similarity matrix to
compute the similarities between a new cluster and the rest of the clusters. The
output of the algorithm is a set of clusters where each cluster contains similar alarm
sequences. The agglomerative hierarchical clustering algorithm is explained in de-
tail in the section Agglomerative hierarchical Clustering in the Pattern analysis of
alarm sequences chapter.
One of the assumptions of this method is that if a group of alarm flood se-
quences are similar enough, they are originated from the same process abnormality.
Hence, we consider each cluster as a representation of a process abnormality. The
alarm flood sequences inside each cluster form a training set from which an "alarm
print" of the process abnormality can be extracted. For each process abnormality
an alarm template containing the representative alarms that identify this process
abnormality can be obtained [Bouchair et al., 2013].
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It may happen that while the process abnormality described in one of the
clusters occur, other alarms that are not associated to the process abnormality are
triggered. These alarms should not be included in the fault template. One way of
filtering out these alarms is to consider just those alarms that have a high frequency
of occurrence in the training set of alarm floods. If an alarm occurs with a high
ratio in the different alarm flood sequences of a given cluster, this alarm is included
in the template. The percentage used for the industrial case study described in this
thesis is set to 50%, i.e. if an alarm is triggered in more than 50% of the sequences
belonging to a given cluster, this alarm will be further considered.
The output of this step is a set of templates defining the process abnormality
corresponding to each of the alarm flood clusters. The alarms contained in these
templates will be the ones considered in the following steps of the method.
5.4 Mapping
In the proposed approach three process information sources are combined: alarm
log, process data and plant topology. Even though the sources differ in the nature
of the data contained, they are related to each other. Signals usually measure a
property of an asset or the product contained in it. For example a signal generated
by a pressure indicator informs about the pressure of the gas contained in a tank.
On the other hand, alarms can be assigned to signals (limit alarms) and also directly
to assets (e.g. a logic alarm indicating a malfunction of a specific asset). This rela-
tion between information sources forms the core of the proposed approach. Hence,
being able to link alarms, signals and assets is crucial.
There is no universal naming convention for alarm, signal and assets’ tags.
This hinders a direct mapping between the information sources. In spite of the lack
of tagging conventions, it is usually possible to identify the connections between
alarms, signals and assets by the similarity of the symbols contained in the tag
names. For instance, the tag name of a temperature controller from section 01 of
the case study is TC11 in the P&ID, this controller has a signal associated whose
tag is TC11CO.XAY and an alarm with name TC11CO is assigned to this signal,
see Table 5.1.
Table 5.1
P&ID asset tag Signal tag Alarm tag
TC11 TC11CO.XAY TC11CO
A way to automatically map the alarm, signals and assets is to use a similarity
index as it has been done to cluster alarm flood sequences. However in this case the
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problem is more simple since there is no time consideration. The selected method
to map tags is the original Smith Waterman algorithm [Smith and Waterman, 1981].
Given a list of alarm tag names and a list of signal tag names, the similarity
index of each combination of strings (formed by signal, alarm or asset names) is
computed. With these indexes a similarity matrix N×M is built, N being the num-
ber of alarm tags and M the number of signal tags. Then a similarity threshold is
set, 0.5 was the chosen threshold for the industrial case study. Each alarm tag will
be mapped to the more similar signal tag if their similarity index is higher than the
threshold value. The same procedure is applied for signal and assets tags and for
alarm and asset tags.
After this step, the connection between the different information sources is set.
The corresponding process and topology data is available to perform root-cause
analysis to isolate the alarm associated to the asset where the fault was originated.
5.5 Root-cause analysis
In the alarm analysis stage, faults that start alarm floods are identified and char-
acterized. However, the causal alarm cannot be isolated relying on the alarms’
time-stamps. The first alarm in time cannot be considered the causal alarm (alarm
associated to the root-cause). This is due to the fact that the time at which an alarm
triggers is highly dependent on the alarm limit settings. Moreover, the time between
an abnormality occuring and the corresponding alarm triggering is not a determin-
istic variable, but a probabilistic one. This is the reason why in order to identify the
first alarm of a fault, the process data associated to these alarms is analysed instead.
With the use of process data analysis, the precedence relationships between signals
can be captured.
The root-cause analysis is performed for each of the alarm clusters found. The
signals associated to the alarms within the fault template are selected for the study.
Based on the assumption that alarm flood sequences within the same cluster have
the same root-cause, the data-driven analysis just needs to be done for one of the
alarm flood periods within each cluster.
The methods available in the PDA software tool will be used for this purpose
(see Chapter 4 for more details on the methods used in PDA). The result of the
process data analysis is a set of suggested signal root-causes. However, there is
generally just one root for a specific fault. In order to reduce the number of spuri-
ous results from the signal analysis, the results are validated with the information
about plant connectivity contained in a graph generated from the intelligent P&ID
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[Thambirajah et al., 2009].
The first step for the topology based validation of the data-driven analysis is to
identify the assets that correspond to the signals used in the data-driven analysis.
These assets will be indicators and controllers. Additionally, the alarm template
that is being analyzed there may contain alarms that are not associated to signals
but to assets, e.g. alarms indicating a malfunctioning pump. These assets are also
automatically included in the topology analysis.
The connectivity of the plant is explored using a graph-search algorithm on
the graph capturing the connections between assets in the plant. The depth first
search is used for this purpose in the software tool implemented in this thesis. The
controllers or indicators suggested as root-causes from PDA are chosen as starting
points of the disturbance. The rest of assets selected for the topology analysis are
chosen as secondary disturbed elements. Then all feasible paths from the suggested
root-cause to each of their secondary disturbed assets are explored. If there are
not feasible paths from the root-cause suggestion to several secondary disturbed
elements, the root-cause hypothesis is not valid since according to the topology
model there is no way that the irregularity in this asset could spread to the other
assets.
Once the spurious results of the data-driven analysis have been filtered out and
one of the root-cause suggestions has been validated with plant connectivity. The
first alarm under which the other alarms within the template will be grouped is the
alarm associated to the root-cause asset.
5.6 Plant areas selection
Experimental analysis of industrial alarm records showed the existence of alarm
floods caused by alarms notifying controllers put on manual mode or alarm floods
reporting malfunctioning ports when an electronic device failed. This kind of alarm
floods are out of the scope of this thesis since they are not caused by a disturbance
or an asset fault propagating through the process via the material, energy or infor-
mation connections. Finding the first alarm with the presented method would be
impossible since there are no signals associated to these alarms.
For some of the plant areas these type of alarm floods are frequent. Filtering out
these areas is beneficial mainly for two reasons:
• Plant-wide monitoring is a large scale monitoring problems. The alarm man-
agement system of these plants usually have several thousands of unique
alarms configured to control the process. It is not rare that around ten thou-
sand alarms trigger each month. The computation time needed to calculate all
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similarity indexes between all alarm flood sequences found in the alarm logs
can easily be longer than one day on a single computer. If those plant areas
containing alarm floods caused by logical sequences are removed from the
analysis, a reduction of the problem complexity can be achieved.
• Including plant areas with alarm floods not caused by a disturbance propagat-
ing through the plant gives rise to a big portion of alarm clusters that are not
in the scope of this method. In this situation, the user has to examine and dis-
card these clusters manually, which would be a tedious and time consuming
task.
A solution to identify the "interesting" areas of the plant is to first perform
the first three steps of the method (alarm log analysis stage) using as an input just
those alarms associated to signals (limit alarms). The reason behind this is that
alarm floods due to propagating disturbances have a big proportion of limit alarms.
Therefore, if areas of the plant with similar periods of high number of limit alarms
are selected, clusters of alarm floods caused by a disturbance propagating through
the plant are targeted.
The purpose of the proposed method is to cluster all alarms originating from the
same process abnormality under the causal alarm. In order to include in this cluster
also alarms that are not associated to signals, the alarm analysis stage is repeated
including all alarm occurrences of the selected areas. All consequential alarms are
therefore identified independently of their type.
The pre-analysis of the alarm log described in this section reduces the compu-
tational time of the similarity matrix and saves the user the tedious task of selecting
the appropriate clusters when dealing with large alarm records.
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Software tool
A substantial part of the work reported in this thesis involves implementing a soft-
ware tool that guides the user through the steps of the proposed method. The tool
was developed under the .NET framework using the development tool Microsoft
Visual Studio 2013. The application is implemented in C#, a high level program-
ming language.
The application consists of a main form that contains three user controls: Alarm
Log Analyzer, Process Data Analyzer and Topology Analyzer. The first user control
performs an alarm log analysis. The second carries out a process data root-cause
analysis. The last one validates the results obtained from the process data analy-
sis. When starting the application, only the Alarm Log Analyzer is available for
the user. Once the alarm analysis is completed, the Process Data Analyzer is en-
abled. And once the signal analysis is completed, the Topology Analyzer is enabled.
In this chapter a detailed description of the functionalities of the developed soft-
ware tool is presented.
6.1 Alarm log analysis
When the application is run, the alarm analysis window is shown (see Figure 6.1).
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Figure 6.1 Start screen, alarm analyzer
6.1.1 Parameter selection
By clicking on the options menu and then on “Change Parameters”, the parameters
of the alarm analysis can be defined (see Figure 6.2).
Alarm flood identification:
• Interval length: time length of the intervals in which the alarm log is divided
(in min).
• Number of alarms: number of alarm occurrences within an interval to con-
sider these intervals an alarm flood episode.
Alarm flood grouping parameters:
• Prefilter threshold: number between 0 and 1 representing the prefiltering
threshold. The larger the value the more combinations of alarm floods will
be filtered out in the prefiltering step.
• Clustering threshold: number between 0 and 1. The larger the value the more
similar two alarm floods have to be in order to group them under the same
cluster.
• Sigma: represents the time delay allowed between alarm occurrences within
different alarm sequences to be considered as a match by the algorithms.
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Figure 6.2 Parameter selection window
6.1.2 Data loading
The next step is to load the alarm log. When the button “Load AlarmLog” is pressed
an open file dialog is displayed. An alarm log saved in a compact proprietary format
(.pca) can be chosen from the corresponding directory.
Once the alarm log is loaded, a frequency plot showing the number of alarms
triggering within each time interval of the alarm log is displayed. The X axis of the
plots in Figure 6.3 represents time, and is divided into intervals of the chosen length.
The Y axis shows the number of alarm occurrences within each of these intervals,
refer Figure 6.3.
The alarm log can be filtered by plant areas. If the focus of the analysis is on
specific plant areas, they can be chosen on the ComboBox with the label “Select
Area”. Once this is done and the button “Load area” is pressed, the frequency plot
is updated according to the user’s selection. In the example area 01 is selected,
displayed in Figure 6.4.
6.1.3 Alarm flood periods isolation and alarm sequences
construction
By pressing the button “Find Alarm Floods”, the periods considered as alarm floods
according to the user’s parameter choice are highlighted in red on the frequency plot.
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Figure 6.3 Alarm log display
The alarm flood sequences are constructed and can be displayed on the ListView
labeled as “Alarm flood:” by selecting the desired sequence on the ComboBox next
to the “Find Alarm Floods” button, see Figure 6.4.
6.1.4 Clustering of alarm flood sequences
Once the alarm flood periods are isolated, the “Cluster Alarm Floods” groupBox
is enabled. By pressing the “Group Alarm Floods” button, the clustering step is
started. The clustering process may take some minutes depending on the number
and the length of the alarm flood sequences found in step 2, for more information
about the clustering method refer to [Master Thesis report]. When the clustering is
completed a new tab is added on the top of the window, called “Alarm Clustering”.
Here, the different clusters found and correspondinglythe alarm sequences within
each cluster are displayed (Figure 6.5).
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Figure 6.4 Alarm flood periods isolated
Figure 6.5 Alarm flood sequences clustered
The alarm sequences within the treeView on the left side of the screen (Figure
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6.5) can be displayed by dragging and dropping in the two visualization windows
labeled “Drag Alarm Flood from tree view”. Once two alarm sequences are dragged
into these windows, the matching alarms found by the Modified Smith-Waterman
algorithm can be seen by pressing the button “Show Matching” (Figure 6.6). Be-
low the two windows, a chart is displayed. On this chart the matching alarms are
displayed over the time. Time zero is taken as the time where the first matching
alarms triggered (in yellow in the example displayed in Figure 6.6). The colors of
the points correspond to the colors of the alarm occurrences displayed on the top
windows. The points above the X axis are the matching alarms of the alarm flood
sequence displayed on the left window. The points below the X axis are the match-
ing alarm occurrences of the alarm flood sequence displayed on the right window.
For instance, in Figure 6.6, alarm PC12/ALY01 which is the first matching alarm
occurrence. It is highlighted in yellow and appears in the chart at time 0 for both
sequences (yellow square and yellow circle). Alarm PI13_1/AHHY01 which is the
third alarm matching found, it is identified by a dark green color. On the plot corre-
sponding to the first sequence (above X axis) a dark green square is plotted at time
228s since this alarm occurred 228s after alarm PC12/ALY01 in the first sequence.
On the plot corresponding to the second sequence (below the Y axis) a dark green
circle is plotted at time 253s since for the second sequence this alarm triggered 253s
after the reference alarm (PC12/ALY01).
Figure 6.6 Alarm sequence matching visualization
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By using this chart, the user can analyze, at a glance, the similarity between two
alarm flood sequences.
The hypothesis of the method is that if two alarm flood sequences are similar
enough, then they are caused by the same fault. Hence, each cluster represents a
different fault. For each cluster an “alarm template”, i.e. alist of alarm types that
characterize the fault, is built. This template can be seen by selecting the corre-
sponding cluster on the ComboBox under the label “Templates:”, refer Figure 6.7.
Figure 6.7 Template visualization
When the alarm flood clustering step is finished, the signal analysis tab (see
bottom left Figure 6.7) is created.
6.2 Process data analysis
6.2.1 Data loading
The Signal analysis window is displayed in Figure 6.8 below.
Before starting the process data analysis, alarm and signals are mapped. The
process data are first loaded. An open file dialog is displayed when the button “. . . ”
is pressed. Once the excel file that contains the process data is selected, the corre-
sponding Excel ranges of the tag names, time stamps and signal values are written
61
Chapter 6. Software tool
Figure 6.8 Process data analysis window
in their corresponding text boxes. The button “Load Data” is clicked, the dataset is
loaded and the signal tags are displayed on the TreeView labeled as “Signals” (in
blue in Figure 6.9).
The template that to be analized is chosen by selecting the template name on
the ComboBox labeled “Select Template:”. The template tags are displayed on the
TreeView labeled as “Alarms” (in red in Figure 6.10). The user is able now to map
the alarm tag names to the signal tag names. Additionally, the user can select which
tags are going to be considered in the mapping by checking/unchecking the box on
the left of each tag name.
6.2.2 Mapping
Once the “Map alarms to signals” button is pressed, the results of the mapping
are shown on the TreeView labeled “Mapping”, Figure 6.10. The Smith-Waterman
algorithm is used to extract a similarity index between the different tags’ names.
Each alarm tag strings is linked to the signal tag string for which the maximum
similarity index is obtained.
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Figure 6.9 Signal data loaded
Figure 6.10 Mapping results
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The names corresponding to alarms are displayed in red, while the tags corre-
sponding to signals are displayed in blue. On the mapping TreeView, under each
signal tag, those alarms that have similar names are displayed.
The user can manually adjust refine the mapping results. A node within the tree
can be removed by selecting it and pressing the key “Delete”. New nodes can be
added by dragging and dropping nodes from the signals and alarms TreeView to
the corresponding position on the mapping TreeView. The user must notice that for
obtaining valid results the structure originally showed must be kept, i.e., signals are
parent nodes and alarms are child nodes, the depth of the tree should not be larger
than two.
The signals displayed on the mapping view are used for following the process
data analysis step.
6.2.3 Preprocessing
Here preprocessing of the signal data can be performed. By pressing the button
“Plot time series” the time trends (Figure 6.11 top) and spectrum (Figure 6.11 bot-
tom) of the signal tags in the mapping TreeView are plotted on the “Preprocessing”
TabPage. The time interval to be considered in the analysis can be chosen using
the trackbars below the plots. The filtering interval is defined with the trackbars on
the right (or by entrying the filter settings on the corresponding textbox and press-
ing “Enter”). Once the settings are defined, the data preprocessing is performed by
clicking on the button “Apply” (see Figure 6.11). Results of the preprocessing are
displayed in Figure 6.12.
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Figure 6.11 Signal preprocessing
Figure 6.12 Signal preprocessing results
The button “Reset” can be pressed in order to undo the data changes done.
6.2.4 Causality analysis and results
The causality analysis is launched by pressing the “Causality analysis” button. A
method based on transfer entropy is implemented in this tool. Transfer entropy is a
information based method evaluating the predictability of a variable from a second
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variable. The results of the computation are plotted and displayed in the tab named
“Process data analysis result” (Figure 6.13 top).
The results are a bubble chart representing transfer entropy based causality ma-
trix (left side) and a list of alarms associated to the analyzed signals, these are the
alarm tags that are grouped under the causal alarm, refer Figure 6.13.
Figure 6.13 Causality results
For the example shown in Figure 6.13, the size of the bubble at the intersec-
tion of tag PC11.XAY on the vertical axis labeled “Cause” and the tag GI01.Y
on the horizontal axis labeled “Effect” is to be interpreted as the extent to which
PC11.XAY influences GI01.Y and this is quantified by the causality measure shown
in the center of the bubble and calculated from the transfer entropy of the time trends
of the two tags. The algorithm used to sort the cluster’s tags places the tag suggested
as a root-cause of the disturbance at the top of the plot. In this case the suggested
root cause is the signal PC11.XAY.
Once the causality calculations are finished, the topology analysis tab (bottom
left Figure 6.13) is created. The root-cause suggestion obtained by the signal anal-
ysis can be validated using the process topology model.
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6.3 Topology analysis
6.3.1 Data loading
The Topology analysis window is displayed in Figure 6.14.
Figure 6.14 Topology analysis window
Once the topology analysis window is loaded, the signals TreeView (blue) and
the alarm TreeView (red) are automatically filled with the signals considered in the
process data analysis step and the alarm tags within the template being studied.
By clicking on the button “. . . ” an open file dialog is displayed. Here, the user
can choose the CAEX file containing the topology model of the plant under study.
When the topology model is loaded, all asset tags found in the CAEX file are
displayed on the assets TreeView (green, Figure 6.14 middle). The plant schematic
is loaded in the tab “Schema” (top left Figure 6.14) and the connectivity matrix is
loaded on the tab “Connectivity Matrix”, see Figure 6.14.
6.3.2 Mapping
Before starting the topology validation, the assets contained in the topology CAEX
file must be mapped to the signals and the alarms. The user can choose which tags
to consider for the mapping by checking or unchecking the box on the left of each
tag. By pressing the “Map to assets” button, alarms and signal tags are linked to
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assets. First, those assets associated to the signals used in the signal analysis are
found. Then the alarms connected to the signals are identified and grouped under
the corresponding asset (this information is extracted from the mapping of the
Process data analysis window, see section 6.2.2). Finally, the algorithm identifies
assets that are assigned directly to alarms (not via a signal), for instance an alarm
notifying that a pump is malfunctioning.
The mapping results are displayed on the mapping TreeView, Figure 6.15. Green
color corresponds to asset tags, red color to alarms and blue color to signals.
Figure 6.15 Mapping results
For example in Figure 6.15 the signal GI02.Y is assigned to the asset G02. The
alarms that were before mapped to this signal can be found under the asset as child
nodes.
The user can add nodes and child nodes by dragging and dropping the nodes
from the signals, alarms and assets TreeViews to the mapping TreeView. The user
can also delete a node from the mapping TreeView by selecting a node and pressing
the key “Delete”.
Afterwards, the user can press de button “Load Mapping” (Figure 6.15) to load
the assets in the topology analysis. The ComboBox under the label “Select Root-
68
6.3 Topology analysis
cause” is filled with the asset connected to the signal suggested as a root-cause by
the process data analysis. The DataGridView under the label “Disturbed assets” is
filled with all the assets present in the mapping TreeView that are not linked to the
suggested signal root-cause, these are the secondary disturbed assets (Figure 6.16).
6.3.3 Topology validation
There are two options to validate the results from PDA using the topology analyzer:
• “Check connections with RC” (root-cause).
• “Path Analysis” (not used in the method presented in this thesis).
Each option can be found under its corresponding tab labeled.
Check connections with the root-cause This option allows the user to check
if there exist feasible paths connecting the root-cause with all the secondary dis-
turbed elements. If this is the case, the text “Feasible” is shown inside the result
bottom and the button turns green. Hence, the suggested root-cause is validated,
and the alarm associated to the root-cause asset is the suggested causal alarm. All
other alarms contained in the mapping TreeViw are grouped under this causal alarm.
Additionally, the paths found are plotted on the process schematic (Figure 6.17).
A graph is also displayed below the Topology analysis GroupBox in order to show
the order in which the disturbance affected the assets (since this cannot be seen on
the process schematic). The root-cause asset is represented as a yellow circle. The
circles corresponding to the secondary disturbed elements are colored with their
respective colors as displayed on the Disturbed assets DataGridView. Assets within
the path which are not in the list of secondary disturbed elements are represented
by a light blue circle. Finally, sensors that are in the path but were not suggested by
the signal and alarm log analyses as disturbed elements are displayed in red. These
assets shoucl be considered carefully as they might be not working properly and a
maintencance operation on them might be required. An example of the topology
validation is shown in Figure 6.16 and 6.17.
If there are not feasible paths connecting the root-cause with one or more of the
secondary disturbed elements the text “Not feasible” is displayed to the user in the
result button and the button turns red. The feasible paths are displayed on the graph.
The tool notifies which asset is the one not connected to the root-cause suggested
on the TextBox at the bottom of the window.
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Figure 6.16 Root-cause validation using process topology
In the example displayed in Figure 6.16, the disturbance originates on the con-
troller PC11_S, and it spreads to the valves G01 and G02. From G01 the disturbance
takes five parallel paths affecting PC12_S, PI15_S, PI15_S, PI14_S and PI13_S.
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Figure 6.17 Schema with the path highlighted
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Industrial case study
This chapter illustrates the benefits of the method by applying the developed work-
flow to real data originated from an ethylene plant. Due to a confidentiality agree-
ment information regarding the process and the plant has been protected in this
discussion.
The case study illustrates the advantages of using a combined information
source (alarm, process and topology data) from a real process plant. The case study
presented is a large scale monitoring problem. The alarm management system of
the plant has more than 3800 unique alarms configured to control the process. The
analysis is performed on 6 months of alarm data, during which more than 48000
alarms triggered.
7.1 Process description
The method is applied to an ethylene plant. In this plant a steam cracking operation,
i.e., a pyrolysis process in which saturated hydrocarbons are broken down into
smaller carbon chains. The feed material is naphtha, i.e., a mixture of C5 to C12
hydrocarbon molecules. The naphtha is diluted with steam and driven inside metal
tubes in absence of air through a furnace where is heated. The gaseous mixture of
naphtha and steam is quickly passed through the furnace (in less than a second) at
low pressure in order to prevent its cracking to carbon form.
The gas is then quickly quenched, to avoid any further reactions. First in a line
heat exchanger and then in a quenching header using quench oil. Subsequently,
the cracked gas is separated. Besides of ethylene, the following products can be
produced in the cracking plant:
• Propylene
• Hydrogen
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• Methane
• Gasoline
• Acetylene
• Aromatics
• C9+product
An schematic of the process is shown in Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1 Cracking plant schema
7.2 Plant area identification
As stated before in Chapter 5, an identification of plant areas with alarm floods
caused by a disturbance propagating through the plant is performed. To do so, the
first step of the method is applied to limit alarm logs. The reason is that alarm floods
produced by a propagating fault contain a big proportion of limit alarms.
The criteria to select the areas for the case study are the following:
• Relatively high number of periods with large amount of limit alarms (>5 in
the 6 months log).
• Some similarity between those periods.
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The required parameters for the alarm analysis are listed in Figure 7.2 together
with their settings.
Figure 7.2 Parameter selection
The time interval granularity of the alarm log is set to 10min since the definition
of an alarm flood is a time interval containing more than 10 alarms per 10 min.
The required number of alarms is set to six. The choice of six alarms is due to
the fact that only limit alarms are taken into account. If a period of 10 min has
six limit alarm occurrences, it is probable more than 10 alarms would trigger. The
pre-filtering threshold is set to 0.2 as well as the clustering threshold. Sigma is 5000
allowing alarms with a time delay of around 3.5 min to be matched.
The used alarm log is in a file with format .pca (“compact proprietary format”)
for which those alarm types that are not limit alarms have been previously removed.
The software tool automatically removes chattering alarms from the loaded alarm
log. Figure 7.3 shows an example of alarm frequency plot in the developed applica-
tion.
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Figure 7.3 Alarm log loaded
The second step of the method is performed by clicking on the “Find Alarm
Floods” button. The time periods corresponding to alarm flood episodes according
to the parameter choice are highlighted in red in the alarm log frequency plot and the
highlighted alarm flood sequences are available for visual inspection by selecting
their name in the combobox next to the button pressed, Figure 7.4.
Figure 7.4 Alarm floods identified
By clicking on the “Group Alarm Floods” button (Figure 7.5), the alarm flood
sequences are clustered according to their similarity. In the example of Figure 7.5,
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a total of 20 clusters is obtained. The largest cluster (Cluster 13), containing ten
alarm sequences, is further analyzed. By dragging and dropping two random alarm
sequences from this cluster to the two windows on the top and by pressing the
“Show Matching” button, one can notice that the matching alarms of these periods
come from the plant area “01”, see (Figure 7.5).
Figure 7.5 Clustering results
According to the chosen criteria area 01, is an area of interest: it has relatively
high number of time periods with a large amount of limit alarms (10 periods).
Additionally, those periods have some similarity as they belong to the same cluster.
In the following section, plant area 01 is analysed.
7.3 Analysis area 01
7.3.1 Detailed description
Area 01 is the cracking and quenching section of the ethylene plant. A schematic of
this area is provided in Figure 7.6.
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Figure 7.6 Area schematic
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During normal operation (cracking mode) valve G02 is fully closed and valve
G01 is fully opened. The naphtha mix feed is divided into two lines whose flow is
controlled by the controllers FC11 and FC01. The naphtha mix is later mixed with
steam whose flow is controlled via flow controllers FC12 and FC02. Each one of
the lines containing a mixture of naphtha and steam is divided into two and driven
through the coils located in the cracking zones inside the furnace. The naphtha and
steam mixture is heated very fast via radiation until it cracks. Following this step,
the cracked gas is cooled with linear quench exchangers where the produced high-
pressure steam is recycled in the plant. The cracked gas is then further cooled in
the quench header by direct contact with quench oil. The flow of quench oil coming
into the quench header is controlled via temperature controller TC11. After this, the
cracked gas is further treated
.
During cracking, “coke” (a form of solid carbon) is produced. The accumula-
tion of coke in the coils reduces the efficiency of the heat exchange process (see
Figure 7.7). Every 60 days the furnace is therefore cleaned by diving a mixture of
air and steam in absence of hydrocarbons through the furnace coils. The mixture
converts the solid carbon (coke) into carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide. In order
to switch the operation mode from cracking mode to decoking mode, the naphtha
feed is stopped by closing valve G01 while valve G02 and is opened allowing air
feed. Once the coils are cleaned, the furnace is reconnected and the plant is back to
the cracking operating mode.
Figure 7.7 Coke accumulation in pipes.
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7.3.2 Alarm log analysis
This section describes the alarm log analysis for area 01 of the ethylene plant. The
input of this stage is the alarm log of just area 01 and the output is the alarm flood
sequences found clustered according their similarity.
The first step in the alarm analysis software tool is to choose the parameters
for the alarm analysis. In the plant example the time interval length is set to 10
min and the minimum number of alarm occurrences to consider a time period as
an alarm flood episode is six alarms. The formal definition of an alarm flood is a
time interval with an alarm rate higher than 10 alarms per 10 min and per operator.
In the plant of the case study an operator supervises more than one area. There-
fore, it seems reasonable to set the minimum alarm rate to less than 10 alarms per
10 min. Additionally, the value of the clustering threshold is doubled to 0.4. As
only alarms originated from area are 01 considered in the analysis, it is expected
that there will be less unrelated alarms and therefore the similarity index between
sequences is expected to be higher. The parameter settings are given in in Figure 7.8.
Figure 7.8 Parameter selection
Once the parameters are chosen, the alarm log including all alarm types is
loaded. In order to filter out those alarms that do not belong to area 01, the area is
chosen in the ComboBox labeled as “Select Area:” and the button “Load areas” is
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pressed
By pressing the button “Find Alarm Floods”, the time periods with high number
of alarms are identified and the alarm flood sequences are constructed. A total of 23
alarm flood periods are found (see Figure 7.9).
Figure 7.9 Alarm flood periods identified
The alarm flood sequences are clustered according to their similarity by clicking
on the “Group Alarm Flood” button. Three clusters are obtained: Cluster 0, Cluster
1 and Cluster 2. Out of the 23 analyzed alarm sequences, four do not belong to any
cluster and 19 are clustered under one of the three clusters (see Figure 7.10).
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Figure 7.10 Alarm sequences clustered
The alarm sequences within each cluster and their similarities are analyzed by
dragging and dropping the alarm sequences from the tree view to the upper win-
dows and by pressing the button “Show Matching”. Figures 7.11, 7.12 and 7.13
show the results obtained when two alarm sequences taken from each one of the
three cluster are compared.
In Figure 7.11, two alarm sequences taken from the first cluster (Cluster 0)
are compared. The plot in the bottom part indicates that a small portion of the
alarms at the beginning of the sequence are triggered and that after approximately
10 min the remaining alarms are triggered almost simultaneously. It is likely that
the alarm sequences belonging to Cluster 0 are not a consequence of a disturbance
propagating through the plant since there is no significant time delay between most
of the alarms. In fact, the condition of the SUO alarm (Substitute value active) that
occur when a port of an online analyzer is malfunctioning. If an online analyzer
is deficient each of its ports will report an alarm separately. Although this kind of
alarm floods sequences cannot be further analyzed by the proposed method, these
findings are useful for the end user as they might suggest a change on the approach
of alarm settings for this kind of devices, e.g. if the device fails it would be better
to generate a single alarm notifying it rather than generating an alarm for each one
of its ports.
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Two alarm sequences taken from Cluster1 and Cluster0 are compared respec-
tively in Figure 7.12 and Figure 7.13. The plots show the similarity between the
pairs of alarm sequences and the existence of time delays between alarm occur-
rences. It is then likely that these alarm sequences are a consequence of a distur-
bance propagating through the plant. One can additionally notice that a large por-
tion of the alarms in these sequences are limit alarms (Condition: AHY01, AHHY01,
ALY01, ALL01).
Figure 7.11 Alarm flood sequences taken from Cluster 2 are visually compared
Finally, the obtained alarm templates of the three fault scenarios corresponding
to Cluster 0 and Cluster 1 are displayed in Figure 7.14.
In summary, a total of 23 alarm flood sequences have been found in the alarm
log of the area 01. Out of these 23 alarm sequences, 19 are grouped under 3 clus-
ters the other four alarm flood sequences are not similar to the rest. The alarm
sequences under Cluster 2 are not caused by a disturbance propagating through the
plant, therefore these alarm sequences are not further analyzed in this work.
7.3.3 Root-cause analysis
In this section the root-cause analysis is described. First process data analysis is
performed and a root-cause diagnosis is suggested. The ABB PDA routines imple-
mented in the process data analyzer of the developed tool are used for this purpose.
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Figure 7.12 Alarm flood sequences taken from Cluster 1 are visually compared
Later, the root-cause suggestion is validated using the process topology with the
Topology analyzer functionality included in the implemented software. Assuming
that alarm flood sequences belonging to the same cluster have the same root-cause,
the root-cause analysis just is done for a single alarm flood sequence taken from
each cluster. The selected alarm flood sequence is AlarmFlood0 belonging to Clus-
ter1.
Process Data analysis A data set with one-second sampling period is used in this
analysis. The process measurements included in the process data file belong to the
selected plant area The file dataset consists of time-stamps in the first column and
the values of the signal measurements in the following columns.
In order to be able to perform the data-driven root-cause analysis, the signals
associated to the alarms included in the template are identified.
“Process data analyzer” can be accessed by clicking on the tab “Signal Analy-
sis”. After loading the process dataset from an Excel file, the template correspond-
ing to Cluster1 is selected and by pressing the button “Map alarms to signals”, the
automatic process alarm/process signal mapping result is obtained as shown on the
mapping TreeView in Figure 7.15.
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Figure 7.13 Alarm flood sequences taken from Cluster 0 are visually compared
Figure 7.15 Automatic mapping
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Figure 7.14 Fault templates. (a) Template Cluster0 (b) Template Cluster1
By visual inspection, one can notice that the tag mapping algorithm gives good
results. Only the alarm with tag “P_11CO_4/O01” is not mapped to its corre-
sponding signal (PC11.XAY). In order to add this alarm to the alarms mapped to
PC11.XAY signal, the alarm node is manually dragged under the signal node in the
mapping TreeView.
The process signals appearing in the mapping TreeView are considered for the
signal analysis (see 7.16). After pressing the button “Causality analysis”, the results
of the causality analysis are displayed on the “Process data analysis result” (see
7.16).
Those signal tags within the mapping TreeView will be considered in the signal
analysis, Figure 7.16. After pressing the button “Causality analysis”, the results of
the causality analysis are displayed on the “Process data analysis result” tab (top),
see Figure 7.17.
The bubble chart suggests PC11.XAY as the close to the root-cause. GI9122.Y,
PC12.XAY, PI15.Y, PI14.Y, PI13.Y, PI16.Y and GI9123.Y as secondary disturbed
signals.
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Figure 7.16 Time trends and spectra of the tags included in the analysis
Topology analysis The topology analysis is used to validate the results of the sig-
nal analysis. The process plant connectivity analysis evaluates if there is a feasible
propagating path from the hypothesized root-cause to all other secondary affected
assets.
The topology analyzer is accessed by clicking on the tab “Topology Analysis”
(Figure 7.18-bottom side).
The assets associated to the signals used in the process data analysis and the
assets associated to the alarms within the fault template are first identified. Once the
process topology information is loaded in the tool, the assets TreeView is automati-
cally populated with the asset tags found in the loaded topology model. By pressing
the button “Map to assets” the automatic mapping between signals and assets, and
alarms and assets is performed (See Figure 7.18 below).
By pressing the button “Load Mapping”, the suggested root-cause asset and
the suggested secondary disturbed assets are automatically loaded into the “Check
connections to the RC” fields. The “Path analysis” option will not be used in this
case study since it is not contemplated in the method.
The validation is carried out by pressing on the “Check Connections with RC”
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Figure 7.17 Causality matrix
button. Results are displayed in Figure 7.19 and 7.20.
The plant topology analysis indicates that there exists a feasible propagation
path starting from the suggested root cause to all secondary disturbed points. In ad-
dition, the graphical visualization depicts the obtained feasible propagation paths.
The graph suggests that the fault propagated from the pressure controller PC11 to
the valves G01 and G02 via the information connection between this controller and
the valves. From valve G01, the disturbance spread to the pressure controller PC12.
And in parallel through the four cracked gas lines to the furnaces where Cracking
Zone A, Cracking Zone B, Cracking Zone C and Cracking Zone D are located (via
the heat exchangers LQE 1, LQE 2, LQE 3, LQE 4). Sensors PI13, PI14, PI15 and
PI16 are also affected by the propagating disturbance they are located in the coils
of the different cracking zones.
The root-cause suggestion from the data-driven analysis is therefore validated
by the plant topology. The connectivity analysis has validated that the pressure
controller PC11 is a valid root-cause of the obtained situation corresponding to
the alarm flood sequences in Cluster1. The alarm associated to this controller is
the given causal alarm suggestion, i.e., alarm PC11_CO_4. All the alarms in the
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Figure 7.18 Mapping to assets
template will be grouped under it.
7.3.4 Discussion of the results
The use of a combination of multiple information sources has proved to be benefi-
cial in order to not only identify alarms caused by the same fault, but also to isolate
the causal alarm within an alarm flood sequence. The evaluation of the alarm log
showed that a specific area within the ethylene plant experienced a significant num-
ber of alarms floods caused by a disturbance propagation through the plant. The
alarm analysis presented in this section reveals the existence of two common ab-
normal situations that lead to alarm flooding. One of these abnormal situations was
further analyzed using process data and plant connectivity data. A root-cause of the
fault was suggested by the data-driven analysis and validated by plant topology. The
causal alarm of the alarm flood sequence that characterizes this fault was identified,
PC11_CO_4.
The obtained results were validated by the site process control engineers. The
two abnormal situations identified in plant area 01 correspond to a mode operation
shift between cracking-decoking and decoking-cracking. The transition between
these two modes of operation triggers characteristic alarm flood sequences. The
alarm flood sequences grouped under Cluster1 correspond to the cracking-decoking
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Figure 7.19 Graphical visualization of the obtained feasible propagation paths
transition while those belonging to Cluster 0 are associated to the decoking-cracking
transition.
The site crew mentioned that pressure controller PC11 is the controller perform-
ing the opening and closing of both valve G01 and valve G02 during the change of
operation mode. Its goal is to prevent any backflow of the cracked gas into the fur-
nace. The transition from cracking to decoking operation mode, the one analyzed,
follows the following sequence:
• Activate control loop PC11-G01 with a fixed differential pressure set point.
• While the valve G02 stays closed, the valve G01 is driven towards its closed
position.
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• When a specified differential pressure is reached, the control loop PC11-G02
is activated with the same differential pressure set point.
• The controller drives the valve towards its open position .
• Once valve G01 is closed, the control loop PC11-G02 is deactivated and the
valve G02 is driven at constant speed until it is completely closed.
This information confirmed our findings: First the pressure controller PC11 is
activated and a set point is entered, this triggers alarms associated to the controller.
The controller drives the valve G01 which triggers alarms connected to it. Pressure
is built in the cracking areas due to the closing of the valve and therefore the pres-
sure alarms connected to the measurement points PI13, PI14, PI15 and PI16 occur.
Once a given pressure is reached, the controller starts moving valve G02 triggering
alarms associated to it. Pressure controller PC12 manipulates the steam flow that
assures the sealing of valve G01 once it is closed. This controller maintains the
differential pressure in the valve at a specified value. When the differential pressure
drops an alarm is triggered.
Even though the alarm floods associated to the operational mode shift are the
result of an operator action. The process experts wanted an alarm reduction for this
operation. In the event of an incident during the transition, the operators will then
be able to focus on the incident and will not be distracted by the alarms related
to the operation mode change. Furthermore, according to the plant operators, the
ethylene plant works smoothly and upsets are not something common. The plant
usually has just one or two abnormal situation in half a year. In order to isolate alarm
floods associated to the critical scenarios, a longer alarm log should be analyzed.
The proposed method was able to identify and reduce successfully the alarm floods
associated to the cracking-decoking shift without previous awareness.
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Figure 7.20 Schema with the path highlighted
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Conclusions
8.1 Contributions
Alarm floods represent an obstacle for the correct supervision of process plants.
They are a source of plant incidents and have become a serious problem in the
process industry. This thesis presents an innovative way to reduce alarm flooding
by using a combination of information sources. Alarm log analysis, process data
analysis and connectivity analysis are used to not only group consequential alarms
originating from the same process abnormality, but also give a causal alarm sugges-
tion.
The work reported in this thesis has been engineered into a software tool that
guides the user through the different steps of the method. A case study with real
industrial data has been presented to demonstrate the utility of the method and the
software tool developed.
8.2 Future Work
In this work, a method that reduces alarm floods off-line has been presented. A re-
configuration of the alarms involved in each of the process abnormalities analysed
could prevent future alarm floods related to these abnormalities. Another direction
of the future work will be to study the applicability of the process for on-line alarm
flood reduction. The authors of the method are aware of the high computational
burden of the presented solution. This makes the direct applicability on-line infea-
sible. However, the fault templates obtained off-line could be use to identify the
process abnormality causing an incoming alarm flood. Similarities between the cur-
rent alarm flood and the fault templates can be extracted. When the incoming alarm
flood presents a high similarity with one of the fault templates, the causal alarm of
this template could be assigned to the new alarm flood and all the incoming alarms
present in the fault could be grouped under the causal alarm.
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such situations the operator might not be able to keep the plant within safe operation. The aim of this 
thesis is to reduce alarm flood periods in process plants. Consequential alarms coming from the same 
process abnormality are isolated and a causal alarm suggestion is given. The causal alarm in an alarm 
flood is the alarm associated to the asset originating the disturbance that caused the flood. Multiple 
information sources are used: an alarm log containing all past alarms messages, process data and a 
topology model of the plant. The alarm flood reduction is achieved with a combination of alarm log 
analysis, process data root-cause analysis and connectivity analysis. The research findings are
implemented in a software tool that guides the user through the different steps of the method. Finally 
the applicability of the method is proved with an industrial case study.
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